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“Political Economy”: Variability and Consistency in the
Development of Worker Owned Cooperatives

By Cris Ramon
Department of Sociology
Macalester College

Abstract
The relationship between worker cooperatives and their social and economic environment
has sparked interest among the sociological community for the contradictions and
harmony typical of these interactions. However, these studies do not examine how firm
behavior varies and/or remains constant in different social conditions. With insights from
economic sociology, neo-institutionalism, and social movements theory, the paper
pursues this issue by answering the following question: how do worker cooperatives
respond to different social conditions over time? Using interviews with members of eight
worker cooperatives in a Midwestern metropolitan area, the author compares behavior in
older and younger cooperatives to observe similarities and differences in their practices
under different social conditions. The analysis demonstrates that differences in social
support and market competition created variation among older and newer cooperatives.
For instance, the decision to start worker-owned cooperatives reflected different political
motivations that emerged from distinct socio-economic conditions. However, all firms
eventually behaved like businesses because they framed economic activities as political
activism, exposing them to fluctuations in the city’s political scene. As a result, these
businesses created market niches, attract customers and competent workers, and copy
other successful democratic enterprises to survive demographic fluctuations in the
market.
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As collectively owned and operated firms, worker cooperatives have intrigued
social scientists because they represent “organizational practices and aspirations that are a
radical departure from those that are available in their capitalist bureaucratic context”
(Rothschild 1984: 308). While some scholars have examined the unique characteristics
of these firms, most studies have examined the problems that emerge between activist
organizations like cooperatives and their wider social context.

In many ways, these

studies emerge from a tradition of research on the conflicts and compromises between
activist groups and their environment. While the research foci and methods vary, the
mystery of institutionalized activism has inspired scholars to examine how social and
economic factors prompt activist organizations and movements like first century
Christianity or third wave feminism to shape their views and behavior.
In the case of worker cooperatives, however, few micro-sociological studies
have examined this issue from an institutional, economic, or social movements
perspective.

Some studies have examined the ways these firms deal with external

pressures such as competition. However, these studies tend to outline these coping
mechanisms without examining the complex relationship between businesses that frame
commercial activity as political activism and their changing environment.

The

methodological lapses of these studies are significant because they ignore the insight of
other sociological perspectives on firms and organizations like neo-institutionalism,
social movement theory, and economic sociology. Since economies and societies are
dynamic in nature, different contexts clearly alter the behavior of political and economic
organizations. The political and economic nature of worker cooperatives subsequently
gives researchers the opportunity to examine how different socio-economic conditions
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shape their behavior. This paper will answer attempt to produce a systematic analysis of
the institutionalization of worker-owned cooperatives by answering the following
question: how does the behavior of worker-owned cooperatives change over time under
different social conditions?
Using interviews with workers from eight different cooperatives, I argue that
differences in social support and market conditions initially created behavioral variability
among two generations of worker owned cooperatives, with older firms being more
militant than younger ones. Over time, these conditions produced consistent behavior
among all cooperatives as they focused on individual survival in their respective market
without significant financial and social support from consumer/activists. Cooperatives
adopted these behaviors because they defined their commercial activities as political
activism, exposing their market niches to demographic fluctuations in the city’s political
community.

Consequently, these organizations focused on strengthening their

organizations and find reliable customers to overcome environmental instability in their
markets and social conditions.
This paper will subsequently present my argument in five sections.

First, I

examine how different social conditions produce different political motivations that
impact the behavior of these firms. I analyze how these conditions subsequently force all
firms to create niches, hire competent workers, and copy successful democratic
organizations to survive in their markets. Finally, I will conclude the paper with a
summary of my argument and directions for future research.
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Theory

Most research on worker owned cooperatives understand these firms as economic
entities continuously in conflict with their economic environment. Most studies have
shown that the democratic organization and the inability to produce capital from workerowners are responsible for these problems.

For example, a study on plywood

cooperatives in the Pacific Northwest suggested that cooperatives depressed wages to
maintain prices low and remain competitive (Sommer et al 1984). Other researchers have
studied how external pressures such as market demand, technological development, and
the distribution of labor create organizational crises that threaten the collective’s
solidarity and force workers to use external resources to resolve these conflicts (Ferguson
1990; Jackall and Crain 1984; Rothschild 1984). To be sure, some studies suggest that
these democratic structures may help increase productivity in some firms (Jones and
Svejnar 1985: 460). However, the literature on worker owned cooperatives promote the
view that the cooperatives exist in a conflict-ridden relation to the wider economy and
that the nature of this conflict rarely varies.
Since these studies examine one socio-economic context, they fail to explore
whether different socio-economic conditions shape the behavior of worker cooperatives.
With the emergence of newer cooperatives, perhaps different social and economic
contexts produce different behaviors. For instance, the rise and fall of social movements
that supported the efforts of cooperators may impact their consumer base. Likewise,
these firms might change their behavior to face changing markets and competition.
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These conditions could also shape the behavior of firms from the 1960s and 70s in
similar or different ways. For example, the loss of support for cooperatives over time
might motivate them to seek new customers. The firm’s isolation within their market
would prompt them to avoid competition by creating niches.

Consequently, this

oversight in the literature raises important issues prominent in other theoretical
approaches to the study of organizations and social movements.
Economic sociology, neo-institutionalism, and social movements theory provide
valuable perspectives on this topic. Economic sociology and neo-institutionalism focus
on the interaction between stable and unstable economic and social conditions and firm
behavior. As Neil Fligstein (1996) argues, stable markets require strong organizations
between within firms and stable distributions of power between firms to promote ordered
competition. With new markets or economic crises, however, firms struggle for power
like new social movements to gain control of the state:
The ability of groups in a social movement to attain success depends on factors
similar to firms trying to produce a stable market: the size of groups, their
resources, the existence of political opportunities to act, state actors willing to
negotiate grievances and the ability to build a political coalition around a
collective identity (Fligstein 1996: 664).
Consequently firms must create strong internal organizations that can survive changing
economic conditions and regulate the distribution of power between firms in a market to
stabilize unregulated competition. Neo- institutionalists follow this point well, examining
how organizations mimic other “successful” organization when “the environment creates
symbolic uncertainty” that threaten its survival (Dimaggio and Powell 1991: 69). In this
sense, unstable or heavily competitive economic and social conditions prompt firms to
create stable organizations that can help their presence grow in their market.
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Accordingly, social movements literature demonstrates how social support for
social movement organizations can also shape the behavior of institutions over time. As
Thomas Rochan argues, a social movement is a group of individuals or organizations that
attempts to implement their values into common social and political practices (Rochan
1998).

While these movements generally emerge from established institutions and

organizations, their growth and behavior interacts with different social conditions
(Friedman and McAdam 1992). Some studies focus on the importance of individual
supporters, demonstrating how social movements mobilize support in an area by bridging
the worldview of potential supporters with the organization’s values and goals through
different political and social frameworks (Snow et al. 1986).

Other theorists have

analyzed how the emergence and disappearance of social and financial resources shape
the growth and behaviors of social movements (Jenkins 1983). While some theorists
have bridged the gap between these perspectives (Friedman and McAdam 1992), this
body of research clearly demonstrates how conditions can impact social movement
organizations by promoting or hindering their ability to mobilize support for their efforts.
However, each individual theoretical view fails to completely capture the
relationship between cooperatives and their environment because they overlook how
social and economic conditions work together to shape firm behavior. The combination
of these perspectives creates a robust framework for analyzing these interactions.
Economic sociology and neo-institutionalism demonstrate how firms respond to crises
that emerge from uncertain economic conditions. Since cooperatives define economic
activities as political activism, however, the strength of this frame depends on support
from activists.

Social movement research fills the limitations of these theories by
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demonstrating how different social conditions impact the behavior of political
organizations and businesses.

This framework subsequently gives researchers the

opportunity to examine how cooperative views and practices defining work as political
activism changes different socio-economic conditions.
This theoretical framework raises three related questions that will guide my
research. First, cooperators must learn how to run a strong democratic enterprise without
the help of business schools or other commercial institutions. How might changes in
consumer/activist support and economic conditions shape this process? Further, firms
with political agendas like worker cooperatives clearly must mobilize support from
activist/consumers to maintain their market position. Therefore, how do these firms react
to changes in activist support for cooperative businesses? Finally, since cooperatives are
commercial enterprises, how do they react to changes in their markets?

Research Design

To understand the different aspects of worker cooperative behavior, I interviewed
workers from eight cooperatives from a Midwestern metropolitan area from October
2005 to November 2005. I choose the firms from a list of collectively-run businesses,
volunteer collectives, and non-profit organizations from a statewide worker cooperative
association. Though other collectively-run organizations exist in the city, I specifically
wanted to study firms that distributed power and profits to all their members because they
faced the same problems as other business firms such as paying workers, developing a
market for their products, and competing directly against other firms in their market.
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All of these firms were in the city’s service economy such as restaurants and retail
stores. Their sizes ranged from three to 20 workers, most of whom are between the ages
20 and 40. Likewise, the age of these firms ranged between two to thirty-one years in
business.

The firms in the sample had a variety of democratic decision-making

mechanisms as well as distribution of workplace responsibilities. Most of the firms were
in a medium to low-income area of the city surrounding two colleges and universities
with large populations of young people as well as immigrants. To maintain the privacy
of the firms in the study, I will call this area of the city “Lakedon” while avoiding using
their names in this paper.
After choosing the study’s sample population, I modeled my research design after
Sommer et al’s comparative analysis of consumer and worker cooperatives (1984). Thus,
I called each firm to schedule an interview a worker with the greatest knowledge of the
cooperative’s history.

Each firm agreed to my request and found me a qualified

respondent to interview. For one interview, however, a cooperative from the 1970s
advised me to interview a former worker since the founding members had left the
cooperative. I subsequently met the workers at their respective cooperatives or other
locations such as coffee shops to interview them.
The taped interviews lasted between sixty to ninety minutes in length, covering
two sets of questions. The first set featured questions covering basic information on the
firm’s years in business and workforce size. The second set of questions about the
development of the cooperative as a business and as a member of a social movement. I
ended each question with follow up prompts to answer additional questions that emerged
throughout the interview. The questions created a narrative that allowed me to compare
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these developments between different firms. With these two points, I used my theoretical
framework to examine patterns in the data, noting the similarities and differences
between older and younger cooperatives’ behaviors in different conditions.

Analysis

After analyzing the interviews, two major trends emerged in the data. First, the
social conditions of the 1970s and the following decades produced major variations in the
political goals and behaviors of newer and older organizations.

Older cooperatives

emerged from the social movements of the 1970s to create an “alternate economy” that
reflected the values of social activists in the area. Conversely, newer generations of
cooperative entrepreneurs started these firms in different markets to meet their own
personal preferences. The variability in the sample, then, emerged from different social
and economic conditions that shaped the motivations and behaviors of these firms.
Despite the variation within the sample, however, the behaviors of newer and
older firms were remarkably similar over time under the same social conditions: without
widespread social support from consumer/activists, many firms eschewed radical political
and economic change, rationalized operations, and embedded themselves in market
niches to survive. In this sense, the political motivations that emerged from the social
and economic conditions of the 1970s made these businesses vulnerable to fluctuations in
the city’s political demography, prompting them to behave like businesses to survive in
their respective markets.

10

Explaining the Variation in Cooperative Behavior

As I have stated, the behavioral and motivational variation in the sample emerged
from changes in the social conditions over time. Specifically, the decision to start these
cooperatives reflects how different social conditions shaped the motivations of these
firms. In older cooperatives, for instance, radical social movements played a critical role
in the emergence of these firms during the early 1970s. While these movements were
mobilizing activist support in the Lakedon area, they also inspired other individuals to
start democratic businesses that would create an alternative sector in the local economy.
Most of these efforts emerged from collusion between different sets of activists.
As a former worker from the city’s first cooperative explained to me, the firm emerged
from interactions between cooperators and other activists interested in starting a new type
of business in the Lakedon neighborhood:
There was some guys who were trying to put together a traditional grocery store
in a cooperative manner… and they found this grocery store… and they went in
and got a lease agreement on it and got to work on opening it … we had some big
community meetings [for the future cooperative at a] people’s center, which at the
time was a center of political activity [in the area] (Interview 11/15/05).
The decision to start cooperatives was more of a political event than a mere business
consideration. By including members of the activist in the community and “hippies”
from communes, the collective entrepreneurs turned the incorporation process into an
exercise in political activism. More importantly, the presence of other activists in these
meetings demonstrates how these organizations would become part of the activist
community in the area over the next few years.
Activists subsequently started more cooperatives in the food industry to create a
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movement of firms that supported healthier living habits and environmental awareness.
As a worker who currently works at a second wave cooperative told me, the founders of
his firm started the business to build up the network of cooperatives in the Lakedon area:
It was 1974, and people that were involved in setting up the grocery cooperatives
became interested in setting up other kinds of businesses ... trying to create an
underground economy. There was definitely a buzz in the air for that [business
model], so an organizing group came from people who work [at a grocery
cooperative] and … they did a business plan, figured out by laws, and bought a
small bar … (and) started running it collectively (Interview 11/4/05).
The worker said these activists viewed the cooperative model as the proper structure for
their business plan because it reflected the radical values of the cooperative movement:
They didn’t ask the question “what kind of business [model]?” [since] it was
assumed it would be a coop. They didn’t conceive that they had another option; it
was assumed that it would be a collective because of the environment they’re in,
with so many cooperatives being developed at the time. There would be no other
option that would be socially acceptable (Interview 11/4/05).
In this sense, the movement’s goals established norms of proper management structures
that produced businesses with collective structures in the Lakedon area.

Other

management structures could not emerge in these conditions because they would deviate
from the movement’s goals of creating an alternative economy. Cooperatives, then, did
not emerge to simply survive and prosper in their respective market. Rather, the decision
to start these firms reflected the hopes of cooperators and other social activists who lived
in the area during the 1970s. As a former worker from a second wave cooperative said,
“It’s hard to appreciate all this [the efforts of cooperators] without appreciating the
hippies. The real optimism people had that we were going to change the world. People
were ... trying to start a counter culture of cooperation” (Interview 11/15/05).
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Thus, these entrepreneurs were like other radical activists that sought social
change during the 1970s. Not only were these individuals starting businesses, they were
also attempting to create to create an alternative sector within the economy that promoted
values such as cooperation and equality in response to the excesses of the militaryindustrial complex.

Support from other activists buoyed these efforts, providing

cooperatives with a source of political and financial stability.

In short, the decision to

start cooperatives reflected efforts to promote wide-ranging social and economic change
throughout the area.

The cooperative was simply the instrument that would allow

activists to complete this task.
While the decision to start older cooperatives clearly reflects political ambitions,
interviews with workers from younger cooperatives revealed more ambiguous political
goals. These ambiguities emerged from two major events that changed the social and
economic environment of the Lakedon area. First, respondents said violent conflicts over
the direction of the cooperative movement in the 1970s divided the cooperative
community’s social and financial resources. These events subsequently led to the demise
of the cooperative movement, leaving older firms isolated in their markets as
disillusioned cooperative activists moved to other endeavors. Finally, the appearance of
cooperatives in other markets and neighborhoods forced collective entrepreneurs to focus
on competition with non-cooperative firms rather than social change. The combination
of these factors prompted workers to start their cooperatives for more personal reasons.
For instance, while some cooperators said political values were important in their
decision, others respondents emphasized economic and practical considerations when
opening their stores. One worker from a newer cooperative told me that his firm emerged
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from the economic prowess of the cooperative model:
All of us (the founders) had been volunteering at an underground collective bike
shop, so we had known each other and had worked in the areas of the bikes …
and there was not a coop for bikes in this town. (The volunteer bike collective)
only sells used bikes, so there is a need for it … it was pretty much the idea to
start as a coop from the start ... it seemed like a powerful approach to keep
morale up and investment in the shop (Interview 10/20/05).
The decision to start some of the cooperative emerged from distinctly economic interests.
Not only were the cooperators interested in meeting the demand for goods from a co-op,
they also believed a democratic structure would help the firm grow control their niche.
Of course, the previous experiences with collective management may have emerged from
political convictions that promote democratic decision-making mechanisms.

Still, it

appears that the strength of the shop takes precedence over other political concerns.
Similarly, other respondents said their businesses gradually became a cooperative
over time due to their comfort with collective management:
Two of the original people started with the idea of a landscaping business, and
one person who came into that was interested in a collective business
organization. Then that person left when I came in. I came from the perspective
of a landscaping business ... but I think in a way it was sort of the natural form for
us ... We wanted a fair structure that gave us a lot of individual flexibility ... [in
a] non-hierarchical way (Interview 11/4/05).
Personal preference for collective management, then, becomes another source of
motivation to begin cooperatives. While political values may this decision, an individual
may also start a cooperative because they are comfortable operating their business with
other individuals in a collective manner. Thus, the decision to start firms in recent years
creates management structures that meet worker’s preferences and strengthened the
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firm’s productivity in the market.
If political values inspired workers to start a cooperative, they were more insular
than revolutionary. As one respondent told me, the workers in his cooperative decided to
turn their workplace into a collectively run store after inheriting it from previous owners:
It was a ‘what then’ sort of thing because it wasn’t doing so well as it was. Our
friend suggested we make it a coop … so everyone put in money … [since] they
weren’t into really having it a traditional structure with an owner and a boss and
the employees (Interview 10/25/05).
Thus, the political nature of cooperatives became more insular over time.

In each

instance, there were individuals who promoted the importance of worker cooperatives for
political reasons. Unlike older generation of cooperators that focused on expanding the
cooperative sector of the economy, however, these activists started their firms to create
organizations that met their needs. The goals and behaviors of newer cooperatives were
insular, promoting the survival of their enterprise within their market rather than
expanding the cooperative sector in the city’s economy.
Clearly, the collapse of the cooperative movement and the emergence of these
firms in separate markets shaped the decision to start cooperatives over time. While
older activists used cooperatives as a pathway to economic change, newer ones viewed
them as organizations that would satisfy their personal preferences or produce
competitive firms. Furthermore, these conditions produced more individualized political
motivations in newer firms that contrasted with the radical ambitions of older
cooperatives. In this sense, different social conditions produced major variation in the
early stages of the development of these firms, reflecting the importance of social support
in shaping their behavior and motivations in their markets.
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Explaining the Consistency in the Behavior of Cooperatives

Due to the variation in my sample, it would seem that the two generations of
cooperatives would behave differently as they developed into full-fledged business. For
instance, older firms would spread cooperatives throughout the city and ignore competing
with other firms in their market. Conversely, newer firms would focus on remaining
competitive in their market while improving its operation. The shift in social conditions
would completely determine their impact on the local economy and community.
While these firms initially behaved differently, the historical shift in economic
and social conditions produced similar patterns of behavior over time. After the fall of
the cooperative movement, newer firms focused on creating powerful democratic
structures while establishing niches within their respective consumer and labor markets to
make a profit and hire strong workers.

Likewise, older firms that survived the

movement’s collapse behaved in similar ways to survive without significant support from
consumer/activists. The following section outlines this argument by demonstrating how
these conditions prompted cooperatives to behave like traditional businesses rather than
social movements that change social institutions.
Competing Against other Firms
Like other businesses, cooperatives coexist with other firms in their respective
market. Regardless of the firm’s political motivations, they must behave like other firms
in some ways. Not only must they attract workers and consumers, they must also
discover methods to deflect the blows of competition. Most of these strategies revolved
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around promoting their unique business model to create niches within their markets to
reduce the number of competitors. While all cooperators created niches, different socioeconomic conditions shaped their strategy’s goals and the appearance of these niches.
In older cooperatives, the firms’ dedication to healthy living practices led them to
stock whole foods, a decision that helped create a market for organic products sold in
bulk. As one former cooperator recalls, “We were offering things they didn’t carry. If
you go into a [supermarket] now, you have a whole foods section. They didn’t have
anything like that, they did that in response to the coops … so we had a profound impact
on grocery stores and supermarkets” (Interview 11/15/05). The emergence of a whole
food market subsequently isolated these firms from other large and small grocers because
they stocked whole foods goods and produce and grains from organic farms. In the
process, the firms avoided competition with other grocers for customers because they met
demand of whole food activists and “hippies” around Lakedon, helping them become
more profitable in the process. As a result, this strategy subsequently protected the
growth of the cooperative movement’s goals.
With the collapse of the cooperative movement, older democratic firms lost
significant support from activists that formed their customer base. The emergence of new
non-cooperative whole food retailers in the city also contributed to this trend. Further,
newer firms emerged in different markets that lacked the mass of cooperatives that
existed in the whole foods market. Consequently, these firms sought to survive by using
their services and goods to gain a small portion of the market. As one individual said,
I think in general we like to feel that we’re not competing against other firms.
Obviously, there’s some ways we are competing with each other, it feels a little
bit awkward, but not too much. One of those businesses focuses on big jobs …
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and we focus on smaller ends of things. It doesn’t totally set us apart, but makes
us somewhat different … Otherwise, we’re sensitive about where people stake out
territory (Interview 10/4/05).
In this sense, cooperatives behave like other small businesses that create niches that
respect the boundaries of other domains in the market.

This process subsequently

benefits all firms because it stabilizes competition, giving cooperatives the opportunity to
grow without competing directly with other firms. While goods and services permit these
firms to accomplish this task, another cooperator notes that the firm’s aesthetics of their
firms and democratic structure helps them as well:
We try to keep a certain niche aesthetically that is different than other [shops]
around, so people try to feel comfortable because of what it is … We are not in
the position to refurnish this place nor would we want to. Other shops do well
that way, but we don’t. We also make it known that it’s collectively owned. A
lot of people are loyal to this place for that reason (Interview 11/4/05).
While I will address the role of the consumer market in the next section, these firms
clearly seek to meet the demand from individuals with certain needs, tastes or political
orientations. In this sense, these firms behave much like their 1970s counterparts by
offering goods that appealed to certain communities within the city to avoid direct
competition in the consumer market.

With changes in socio-economic conditions,

however, these strategic efforts to create structures that would protect the individual firm
than promote the goals of a social movement. The new role of niches demonstrates how
the collapse of the social movement and market pressures turned these agents of social
change into economic actors.
Finding Consumers
The process of creating niches also prompts cooperatives to attract a particular
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clientele that will sustain their market position.

For cooperatives, this task means

attracting individuals with similar value systems that value cooperation and democracy in
economic life. However, the historic shift in environmental factors also changed the
manner cooperatives sought out new customers in the consumer market.
Initially, the creation of consumer niches reflected efforts to build a community of
activists and cooperators that would support the political goals of these firms. For the
most part, this network of activist consumers and cooperatives emerged in low-cost
housing areas around the Lakedon area:
There was no separation between the neighborhood and the coop. The area was a
hopping place, there were people in the coops, people who were musicians, a free
clinic, the anti war movement ... The lines were pretty blurred, it was the same
people [in all these movements] … you couldn’t live in the area without knowing
there was really neat shit going on (Interview 11/ 15/05).
The consumer niche that sustained the cooperative’s whole food market was an active
political body of individuals. Consumers were not simply purchasing goods like other
customers at traditional grocers. Rather, they were helping their fellow activists create an
alternative economy in the area. Consequently, the effort to create niches within the
consumer market was an effort to mobilize political and financial support for these firms
and their market among the activist community in the Lakedon area, helping many of the
cooperatives to become profitable in the early 70s.
With the collapse of the movement, however, the support for these cooperatives
drifted from Lakedon as workers and activists grew older and moved to other parts of the
city.

At the same time, numerous immigrant groups came to the neighborhood,

establishing businesses that catered to their communities. Consequently, the Lakedon
area, which was the center of the cooperative movement’s social support, became a
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neighborhood without any regard for the political goals of these firms. As a current
worker from a 70s era cooperative notes,
It’s not our neighborhood anymore. We’re not associated with the neighborhood
through [our name], and we’re in [that neighborhood]. It seems like it should be
integrated in the community, but it’s not. Most of our customers come from other
areas. It was generally was not supported by the community … even though the
cooperative community is in this area (Interview 11/4/05).
Without the support that helped cooperatives maintain their niche, old and newer
cooperatives subsequently shifted their efforts to attract costumers from areas like local
colleges and universities that have high populations of young people with progressive
political views. Other firms outside of the Lakedon area focused on attracting “hip”
clientele and residents from their growing neighborhood:
This neighborhood has changed a lot in several years, that’s why we’re doing
better now – the neighborhood has become gentrified a bit ... there are more art
galleries, that’s more overt and advertised and that makes a difference for us.
People who go to art shows think “there’s that funky little [store].” But, the
neighborhood is still pretty diverse. Most people who are blue-collar people feel
pretty good about coming in here (Interview 10/25/05).
In this sense, the geographic divide between the co-ops and their clientele reflects the
changing role of consumers for these firms. Rather than becoming activists promoting
wide-spread social change, the cooperatives’ clientele are primarily consumers.

Of

course, these exchanges are not totally commercial in nature: some customers return
because these firms reflect their political and aesthetic values. Still, the consumer niches
remain commercial because they promote the survival of individual firms rather than
supporting broader efforts to change the economy.
Accordingly, the maintenance and expansion of these consumer niches
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demonstrates how these new conditions shaped the behavior of these firms. Without any
social support in the immediate area, new firms and surviving cooperatives attract
customers from other areas of the city. Rather than mobilizing support for a political
goal, however, these firms try to create a customer base that would allow them to sustain
their niche. While the profitability of these efforts varied throughout the sample, these
strategies demonstrate how the cooperative movement’s disintegration and the pressure
from markets forced cooperators to focus on the survival of their firm.
Finding and Hiring Workers
The process of finding individuals to work at cooperatives yielded similarities and
differences with the creation of consumer and market niches. Since all cooperatives were
in the service industry, they competed with other firms for similar applicants, mostly
young people with few major financial constraints. In order to successfully find workers,
however, all cooperatives used similar methods to create niches within the labor market.
In some cooperatives, workers used their social networks to create pools of
potential workers. As I noted previously, older cooperators generally lived in the same
area as other consumers and collective firms, making it easier for workers to find
potential applicants through networks of activists. While these networks collapsed after
the 1970s, newer cooperatives also use their social ties throughout the city for the same
ends. As one interviewer told me, his firm relied on mutual friends to replace workers:
[In the beginning] it was … four people. There was one guy who worked here
who didn’t want to be in a cooperative. But then somebody else came on board
who was a friend of a friend. Like right now, we don’t need someone else. But
things change, and people move away. At that time, it’ll be one of our friends
[who replace them] (10/25/05).
In this sense, the network between cooperators help these firms find qualified workers by
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narrowing the range of the labor market. Given the personal and intimate nature of
collective work (Furgeson 1990), it makes sense that cooperatives would use this method
to create a niche within the labor market. Not only does the strategy help firms find
workers who share the same values, it helps them find individuals who are comfortable
working with the other cooperators.
Accordingly, political values play a major role in the search for new employees.
Like the creation consumer and market niches, the unique political and business
characteristics of these firms also attract potential workers. As one respondent observed,
The very form of democratic workplace begins to attract its own clientele ... a
group of people who want to be a part of it … because it was simply attractive by
the politics of the things and working in a collective… that combination continues
to attract people to be part of the collective … It’s never been hard [to find
workers] … there have been many more people wanting to work than we can hire
(10/25/05).
The role of political values is critical because they help cooperatives avoid
competing with other firms by attracting like-minded individuals to the firm. However,
the creation of these niches within the labor market limits the firm’s appeal to a wider
audience that would apply to similar businesses. Furthermore, political values do not
guarantee the workers’ competency in a collective business (Jackall and Crain 1984: 98).
While other firms rely on workers to sell their labor in the market, cooperatives may
attract individuals more interested in the firm’s ideology rather than its work. With the
pressures from the market, incompetent workers would compromise the firm’s
productivity.

In this sense, the political values and personal networks that help

cooperatives avoid competition in the labor market also create major political and
economic liabilities for these firms.
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While workforce diversity remains an issue for these cooperatives, an extensive
hiring process helped all cooperators alleviate competency issues by selecting individuals
who can contribute to the firm’s success. While the process varied among the firms, one
particular interviewee outlined its basic traits quite well:
We read people’s applications, and we call and schedule interviews with them.
We start by explaining about [the firm] and the low pay, basically try to scare
people off. We ask a series of questions, then we invite them to come to a trial
shift. They come and we are able to work along with them to see if they are able
to do the job and do it fast. We actually call them back if we are really interested
to interview them with the whole collective. [In the group interview] people are
able to ask questions of them, and [the interviewee] can ask questions of us.
Afterwards, we ask them to leave the room, and form a consensus around whether
they’re hired (or not) (10/11/05).
The hiring process then addresses two issues that emerge over the course of finding
potential workers. First, the firm can gauge an individual’s dedication to its values by
outlining the firm’s pay rate. While the motivations to work at these firms changed over
time from proto revolutionary goals to political preference for collective work, the
interview process eliminates interviewees with strong economic motives. Further, the
trial session tests an individual’s competency in collective work, allowing cooperators to
pick skilled workers in the applicant pool. Once the firm hires the employee, a trial
period begins for the new worker to test their skills even further:
After six weeks, there is a check in with the hiring coordinator,” he said. “She
explains all the policies we have and asks how its been going, asking what things
they noticed or what would help them. Then we would have an evaluation at two
months and then at three months, there is an evaluation whether or not they
become a collective member (10/11/05).
In this sense, the hiring process attempts to create stronger organizations by selecting
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competent workers that will contribute to the cohesion and productivity of the firm.
The purpose of these efforts, however, changes in different social environments.
In older firms, these efforts reinforced the strength of the cooperative movement’s efforts
to create an alternate economy. By picking stronger workers, cooperatives could grow
and reproduce, helping the movement spread throughout the city.

Conversely, newer

and surviving second wave firms hired better workers to promote their efficiency in the
market and increase its chances of survival. After all, productive workers help firms
respond to pressures from the market more effectively.

Thus, the hiring process

demonstrates how external factors produced and shaped the role of strong internal
organization in these firms.
Learning How to Run a Cooperative
The process of organizing collective decision-making mechanisms presents a
unique challenge to collective entrepreneurs, regardless of the time period.

The

cooperative must create a strong internal organization to remain efficient and productive.
Further, the firm must also maintain its democratic structure amidst competitive
pressures. Accordingly, the changes in social conditions shaped the motivations behind
efforts to create structures that mediated these tensions.
In older firms, workers generally experimented with different models to create a
collective firm.

Without schools or other organizations that teach workers how to

organize collectives, democratic firms emerged as workers simply tested and discussed
the benefits of different decision-making mechanisms and collective models.

Not

surprisingly, this process was inefficient, creating ambiguities about the distribution of
responsibilities among workers. As one respondent recalled,
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It was pretty dog gone hit or miss [figuring out how to run a cooperative]. There
was a lot of discussion in the minutes about lack of follow through, they would
have discussions and make decisions and no one would implement the decisions.
Or it was a joint effort and only one person would put much time into it
(Interview 10/25/05).
In this sense, the initial process of learning to run a cooperative was incredibly inefficient
since workers were trying to create structures that balanced the efficiency and
democracy.

In this manner, the first cooperatives were laboratories where robust

democratic structures emerged through experimentation. These firms eventually created
working democratic models that successfully met demand from their markets during the
1970s. As the movement grew, activists from other firms started new businesses using
their collective work experiences and information from older cooperators to create
stronger collectives. For instance, one worker from a second wave cooperative said these
networks helped his businesses’ founders create collective-decision making mechanisms:
Most of the people who started [the firm] were workers at these other collectively
run places so they took off that lead. If they had a question, they would go to
another place and say, ‘hey how'd you do it?’ And they say, ‘this is what we did,
go talk to these people.’ And they say something different. So they would get all
these stories and make their own way; they invented some things, or they
followed other peoples’ paths. There definitely was mutual aid and policy in
terms of how to run a business (Interview 11/5/05).
With a wide range of information, the network among cooperatives and cooperators gave
new collective entrepreneurs useful tools to create stronger democratic structures. First,
the network trained and produced entrepreneurs who could run cooperatives efficiently
with their experience in other firms.

Moreover, the cooperative movement helped

cooperators find strong democratic structures that met their personal preferences and
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created better firms in the process. Thus, cooperatives behaved like organizations that
improved their organization by using experience and information to copy other successful
firms. Given the socio-economic context of the 1970s, however, these efforts were not
individualistic.

Rather, they reinforced the goals of the cooperative movement by

creating stronger organizations that could expand the whole foods market.
After the collapse of the cooperative movement, however, cooperators used these
resources for different ends. Like firms in the 1970s, individuals who worked at other
cooperatives were critical sources of information. Often times, these individuals knew
what distribution of work, decision making mechanisms, and democratic structures were
most productive in the market.

Consequently, these entrepreneurs helped their co-

workers learn how to run a cooperative business if they lacked experience with collective
workplaces.

After working at two collective stores, for instance, one interviewee

explained to me how he helped his coworkers develop a collective structure for his firm:
I took experience having worked at [a collective book store] and having worked at
a [collective grocery] … so I organized workshops to teach people about the
process. We made some decisions [to run the firm] based on people’s experience
of consensus to make [the business] really democratic and make it move forward
(10/11/05).
While the democratic nature of this process is ambiguous, the individual’s experience
demonstrates the importance of individual knowledge in the development of these firms.
Entrepreneurs use their knowledge from other firms to create democratic structures more
effectively than workers without any collective work experience. While all individuals
can participate in this process, the experience of cooperators helps the process by guiding
the development of the firm’s organization. Thus, the cooperative can create democratic
structures that satisfy the needs of its workers. Further, these entrepreneurs can help train
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new generations of cooperators who will contribute to the firm’s productivity. In short,
cooperators with previous experience reinforce the cooperative’s strength.
These cooperative networks also furnish collective entrepreneurs with operational
information that helps them run their shops.

Some firms used legal information from

other businesses to help them incorporate as cooperatives under federal and state law.
More commonly, many cooperatives copied minor operational details from other firms.
As one worker said, information from other cooperatives helped his firm fix minor issues:
Mostly we got ideas [from other cooperatives] for fine-tuning [the operation of
the business]. We had all been visiting existing coops and collective businesses ...
so we did learn from there ... most of that after were details that came after we
were in the thick of it though (Interview 10/20/05).
While the selection process generally varied from firm to firm, the workers generally
decided as a group what information will help them improve the operation of their firm in
their own situation.. Like the use of individual experience, then, information from other
cooperatives does not dominate the development of these organizations. Rather they
serve as reference points for other firms, giving cooperators the opportunity to create
stronger organizations that meet their needs.
While these efforts are similar to older cooperatives, they emerged from different
sets of social conditions. Instead of strengthening a movement, new coops and firms
from the 1970s copied other successful democratic structures to improve their individual
business. Not only would effective structures allow these businesses to gain some control
over their niche, they would also allow cooperatives to grow as a firm. Of course, many
of these businesses received aid from other firms in a loose federation of cooperatives in
the state. However, these efforts were meant to improve the operation of the firm rather
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than the cooperative network. Consequently, the collapse of the cooperative movement
prompted all cooperatives to copy copied other firms to survive in the market.

Conclusion

Throughout the analysis, this paper attempted to answer the following question:
how worker cooperatives respond to different social conditions over time. As I have
argued, the collapse of the social movement social support and the emergence of these
firms across markets created conditions that produced variability and consistency in the
behavior of cooperative firms.

First, older cooperatives emerged from the social

movements of the 1970s to create alternative markets while subsequent generations of
cooperators started these firms to satisfy their own personal preferences.

After the

movements collapsed, however, cooperators, new and old, created niches in their
respective consumer and labor markets while copying other successful cooperatives to
survive without the support from activists/consumers. All firms in my study eventually
behaved like businesses because their political motivations exposed their niches to
fluctuations in the city’s political scene, forcing them to strengthen their organizations
and find reliable income from regular customers.
Theoretically, these findings suggest that social support and market forces can
shape the behavior of businesses like worker cooperatives that define work as a political
activity.

Since older cooperatives relied on political and financial support from

activists/consumers to maintain their niches, the collapse of the cooperative movement
contributed to the instability of the local food market. Consequently, firms, old and new,
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created shelters within their respective markets and stronger organizations to survive
without the support of the cooperative movement.

This case study on worker

cooperatives subsequently contributes to economic sociology and neo-institutionalism by
demonstrating how the organization’s political and social goals can expand the factors
that shape its behavior in the market.
However, these organizations represent only a small percentage of businesses that
shape expansion of their consumer and labor markets by defining their economic
activities as political or social activism. Christian bookstores, feminist booksellers, vegan
clothing shops, and whole food vendors are all businesses that define their commercial
activities in similar terms. Clearly, these businesses emerged from distinct socio-political
and historical contexts that shaped their development and operation within the market.
Still, scholars should study them to understand how framing commercial activities as
social activism shapes the expansion and contraction of markets in the face of
demographic change. Further, these studies should also consider how these framing
practices shape the operation and organization of these businesses in their respective
markets.

While scholars can utilize a variety of methods to examine these issues,

answers to these questions will help the discipline’s effort to outline the complex
relationship between society and economy.
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